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Ernest A. Young 
Dartmouth College v. Woodward and the Structure of Civil 
Society 
18 U.N.H. L. Rev. 41 (2019) 
A U T H O R .   Alston & Bird Professor, Duke Law School.  This essay is a modified version of remarks 
given at Dartmouth College’s celebration of the 200th anniversary of Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward.  I am grateful to Justice James Bassett and Professor Donald Pease for spearheading 
that event, to John Greabe for getting me involved, and to the University of New Hampshire Law 
Review for publishing the proceedings.  I first encountered the Dartmouth College case in the 
undergraduate constitutional law course taught by the late Professor Vincent Starzinger, who 
embodied Dartmouth’s commitment to extraordinary undergraduate teaching and inspired 
many of us to become lawyers.  Professor Starzinger deserves most of the credit for anything of 
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I NT R ODUC T I ON 
Dartmouth College v. Woodward held that a private college’s charter was a 
contract, and that the State of New Hampshire’s effort to alter the terms of that 
charter impaired the obligation of the contract in violation of the Constitution’s 
Contract Clause.1 As a matter of doctrine, Dartmouth College has relatively little 
significance today.  Its particular holding is readily drafted around.  Once the Court 
held that the Contract Clause applied only to retrospective impairments of 
contractual obligations,2 states could include limitations on the rights conveyed in 
such charter at the time they were issued.  The Contracts Clause retains more force 
in cases involving the State’s own agreements than it does with respect to regulation 
of private contracts,3 but contemporary federal litigation under the Contracts 
Clause—much less claims relying directly on Dartmouth College—remains quite 
rare.4 A plausible working title for these remarks would be: “It is an obscure case, yet 
but there are those who love it.”5 
Nonetheless, by holding that New Hampshire could not alter the terms of 
Dartmouth’s charter, the Supreme Court prevented the Granite State from 
interfering in Dear Old Dartmouth’s affairs.6  Dartmouth College is frequently 
credited with establishing the autonomy of private higher education in America.7  
 
1  See Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
2  See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827). 
3  See, e.g., United States Tr. Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (invalidating legislation allowing 
a state to retroactively alter the terms of its bond obligations). 
4  But see Emily D. Johnson & Ernest A. Young, The Constitutional Law of State Debt, 7 Duke J. 
Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y 117, 131–34 (2012) (discussing recent Contract Clause litigation concerning 
state efforts to adjust their pension obligations). 
5  Apologies to Daniel Webster (Dartmouth class of 1801), who, in his argument before the U.S. 
Supreme Court on the College’s behalf, famously said, “It is Sir, as I have said, a small college.  And 
yet there are those who love it!”  Or at least we think he said this.  Webster’s peroration is not 
included in Wheaton’s report of the case.  It traces to an account by Chauncey Goodrich, a Yale 
professor who attended the argument and thirty-six years later wrote down his recollection in a 
letter to Rufus Choate.  See generally G. Edward White, The Marshall Court & Cultural 
Change, 1815–1935, at 615–16 (abr. ed. 1991) (quoting Choate’s report of the peroration and 
expressing some skepticism).  Of course, every true son or daughter of Dartmouth accepts the 
Goodrich-Choate text of Webster’s peroration as an article of faith—just as we know that the 
Lorax is real and that forest green is the most beautiful color on Earth.  
6  Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 652–54. 
7  See, e.g., John S. Whitehead, How to Think about the Dartmouth College Case, 26 Hist. of Educ. 
Quart. 333, 334 (1986) (“Almost every previous historian of higher education . . . had asserted in 
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Chancellor Kent, for example, said that the decision “did more than any other single 
act . . . to give solidity and inviolability to the literary, charitable, religious and 
commercial institutions of our country.”8  Kate Stith-Cabranes has shown that New 
Hampshire’s intentions were plausibly benign.9  But it is hardly difficult to imagine 
less savory efforts by state (or federal) governments to undermine freedom of 
teaching and inquiry at private universities—perhaps to prevent criticism of 
government policy or simply to favor particular government interests.10  
When we think of the autonomy of universities in American constitutional law, 
we generally think of the First Amendment’s protections for academic freedom.11  
But other constitutional principles also protect the autonomy of universities.  I 
focus here on the important structural role that the Contract Clause played in 
Dartmouth College v. Woodward.  The Contracts Clause is, at first glance, a rights 
provision, protecting individuals from the governmental impairment of their 
contractual entitlements.12  But as Akhil Amar has shown, rights provisions play 
vital structural roles in American Constitutionalism.13  By insulating private 
universities from public control, the Marshall Court’s interpretation of the 
Contracts Clause in Dartmouth College helped to ensure that private institutions of 
higher learning would remain autonomous voices in American civil society. 
The importance of such voices was a central concern for Alexis de Tocqueville, 
who published Democracy in America14 in 1835 as the Marshall Court was drawing to 
 
one form or another that the Supreme Court’s decision in that case encouraged the development 
of ‘private’ colleges by protecting them from state encroachment.”). 
8  Quoted in Justin Zaremby, The Dartmouth College Case at 200, The New Criterion (Feb. 
2019), https://newcriterion.com/print/article/10590 [https://perma.cc/R8MU-JE3K]; see also Harry 
A. Blackmun, Remarks, in A Ceremony Marking the 175th Anniversary of the Supreme Court 
Decision in the Dartmouth College Case 5, 6 (Feb. 2, 1994) [hereinafter 175TH Anniversary 
Ceremony]. 
9  Kate Stith-Cabranes, Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward and the Enduring 
Significance of Self-Governance, in 175TH Anniversary Ceremony, supra note 8, at 12–13. 
10  See infra notes 107–109 and accompanying text. 
11  See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of New York, 385 U.S. 589, 603 
(1967); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).  
12  The Contracts Clause provides that “[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts . . . .”  U.S. Const. art I, § 10, cl. 1.  See generally James W. Ely, Jr., The 
Contract Clause: A Constitutional History (2016). 
13  See generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L. J. 1131 (1991). 
14  Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop, 
eds. 2000) (1835, 1840). 
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a close.  Tocqueville saw democratic equality as the central fact about America.15  He 
thought that the great risk that such a democracy would run was the propensity of 
democratic levelling to clear out all the intermediary institutions—feudal 
aristocracies, church establishments, trading guilds and the like—that once existed 
between the individual and the state.  With these intermediary institutions gone, 
individuals would be ill-equipped to resist a form of “democratic despotism” by 
which the State would gather all power to itself in the name of providing for human 
wants.16  Tocqueville thought the answer to this propensity in democratic societies 
was a robust civil society full of active private associations and other intermediary 
institutions.17 
It is thus an important but sometimes overlooked part of the genius of our 
Constitution that it facilitates the development of a robust civil society.  It does not 
simply protect the individuals in that society from restriction of their rights; it also 
provides mechanisms that encourage the development of vibrant private 
institutions capable of checking government action even when individuals cannot.  
Dartmouth College is an important part of that story.  I also want to argue, however, 
that this rosy outcome is not inevitable, and that certain developments in American 
politics threaten the ability of private intermediary institutions—including 
universities, but not only universities—to play the vital role that Tocqueville and the 
Founders envisioned for them.  
I .  D A R T M O U T H  C O L L E G E  AND T HE  C ON T R AC T  C L AUS E 
The Contract Clause provides that “[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . Law 
impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . .”18  We generally think about this Clause 
as an individual rights provision, and it is.  When the Framers worried about the 
tyranny of the majority, they tended to have foremost in mind, not white 
slaveholders oppressing black people, or religious majorities oppressing dissenters, 
but rather populist appeals to oppress creditors by relieving debtors of their 
contractual obligations.  And so the Contracts Clause, which tends to foreclose debt 
relief legislation, was the most important rights provision included in the original 
Constitution prior to ratification of the Bill of Rights.19  The sort of economic rights 
that the Contract Clause protects have largely fallen out of favor in contemporary 
 
15  See id., Vol. I, Introduction, at 3. 
16  See id., Vol. II, Part Four, ch. 2–3, at 640–45; ch. 6, at 661–65. 
17  See id., Vol. II, Part Two, ch. 5, at 489–92; Part Four, ch. 7, at 666–73. 
18  U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
19  See generally Ely, supra note 12. 
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jurisprudence, but that should not blind us to the fact that the Contract Clause was 
the Constitution’s most frequently litigated and enforced rights provision at least 
until ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Dartmouth College v. Woodward was a key early precedent establishing the 
Contract Clause’s scope and importance.20  The British crown granted a charter to 
the trustees of Dartmouth College in 1769.  It did so at the urging of Eleazar 
Wheelock, a Congregationalist minister who was looking to expand his efforts to 
educate Native Americans and to branch out into educating English colonists as 
well.21  Although the Supreme Court’s opinion in the Dartmouth College case 
characterized the College’s founding as a wholly private affair, that account omits 
not only significant public contributions of money and land but also a significant 
public purpose: “preparing men for positions in the ministry and in civic leadership, 
with perhaps some elementary teaching of Indians, to boot.”22  The charter made 
Eleazar Wheelock president of the new college for life, and it also allowed him to 
choose as his successor his son John Wheelock.  Toward the end of John Wheelock’s 
thirty-five year tenure, however, disputes arose between him and the College’s 
trustees.23 John Wheelock penned an anonymous indictment of the trustees’ 
meddling in college affairs; the trustees responded with an investigation; and John 
Wheelock ultimately sought support from New Hampshire’s Governor and 
legislature.24 
The Dartmouth Trustees dismissed John Wheelock from the presidency in 1815, 
and Wheelock again turned to the legislature for support.  The state legislature—
 
20  For accounts of the case, see Stith-Cabranes, supra note 9, at 15–16; White, supra note 5, at 
175–80, 612–28; David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The First 
Hundred Years, 1789-1888, at 141–45 (1985). 
21  Id. 
22  Stith-Cabranes, supra note 9, at 14; see also John S. Whitehead, The Separation of College 
and State: Columbia, Dartmouth, Harvard, and Yale 1776-1876, at 15, 31–36 (1973). 
23  John Wheelock appears to have been a somewhat overbearing sort; the trustees would later 
complain that “[s]uch men are always the heroes of their own story.”  (Quoted in Whitehead, 
supra note 22, at 55).  As Professor Stith-Cabranes notes, however, the dispute stemmed not simply 
from Wheelock’s alleged incompetence and dictatorial tendencies, but also from religious 
disputes arising out of the Second Great Awakening.  See Stith-Cabranes, supra note 9, at 1411–12; 
Steven Novak, The College in the Dartmouth College Case: A Reinterpretation, 47 New England 
Quarterly 550, 563 (1974).  And the State’s attempt to take control of the College was not simply 
a naked power grab; rather, it represented a genuine dispute over the appropriate nature of higher 
education and the State’s role in it.  See Stith-Cabranes, supra note 9, at 12–13; Eldon L. Johnson, 
The Dartmouth College Case: The Neglected Educational Meaning, 3 J. Early Republic 45 (1983). 
24  See Whitehead, supra note 22, at 53–59. 
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now controlled by Jeffersonian Republicans hostile to the Federalist trustees—
enacted a statute amending Dartmouth’s charter.  These amendments increased the 
number of trustees from twelve to twenty-one, empowered the state governor to 
appoint the new trustees, and created a board of overseers—also appointed by the 
governor—that would control the trustees on important matters.25  The statute even 
touched that third rail of Dartmouth alumni politics, rebranding our beloved 
College on the Hill as “Dartmouth University.”26  It may be an exaggeration to say, 
as David Currie put it, that the legislature had “turned a private school into a public 
one”;27 as other historians have pointed out, Dartmouth would still have retained 
considerable autonomy under the new arrangement.28  Nonetheless, the changes 
were too much for the board.  The old trustees filed suit against the College’s 
treasurer, who had sided with Wheelock and the State, to recover the College’s seal 
and other corporate property from the interlopers.  The key allegations were that 
the College’s original charter was a contract, and that New Hampshire’s law 
reorganizing the College impaired the obligation of that contract in violation of the 
federal Constitution.29  
When the case reached the Supreme Court, Chief Justice John Marshall thought 
that “[i]t can require no argument to prove, that the circumstances of this case 
constitute a contract.”30  He thus set out to decide two questions: “1. Is this contract 
protected by the constitution of the United States? 2. Is it impaired by the acts under 
which the defendant holds?”31  The first issue came down largely to whether the 
charter was a “public” or a “private” contract: 
If the act of incorporation be a grant of political power, if it create a civil institution, to 
 
25  See Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 652; see also Whitehead, supra note 22, at 59–63. 
26  See Stith-Cabranes, supra note 9, at 10–11; see also Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 664 
(Washington, J., concurring) (“The name of the corporation, its constitution and government, and 
the objects of the founder, and of the grantor of the charter, are totally changed.”).  On the 
continually fraught issue of a name change, see, for example, Joseph Asch, Trustees Seriously Debate 
Name Change to Dartmouth University, Dartblog (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.dartblog.com/data
/2013/01/010586.php [https://perma.cc/75WJ-9C55] (asserting that “the alumni would be aghast”).  
27  Currie, supra note 20, at 143.  It is worth remembering that the sharp modern distinction 
between “public” and “private” institutions developed somewhat later.  Institutions like Harvard, 
Yale, Columbia, and Dartmouth all received considerable public support, and had considerable 
public involvement in governance, in the early Republic.  See generally Whitehead, supra note 22, 
at 4–5, 9–52. 
28  See Whitehead, supra note 22, at 63–64. 
29  Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 604. 
30  Id. at 627. 
31  Id. 
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be employed in the administration of the government, or if the funds of the college be 
public property, or if the state of New Hampshire, as a government, be alone interested 
in its transactions . . . the legislature of the state may act according to its own judgment, 
unrestrained by . . . the constitution of the United States. 
But if this be a private eleemosynary institution, endowed . . . for objects unconnected 
with government, whose funds are bestowed by individuals, on the faith of the 
charter . . . there may be more difficulty in the case . . . .32 
This may have been, as Judge Henry Friendly suggested, an overly bright line.33  And 
Chief Justice Marshall’s conclusion that the College fell on the private side of it may 
have failed to consider important evidence that would have muddied the waters, as 
Professor Stith-Cabranes has pointed out.34  Nonetheless, the Court concluded:  
Dartmouth College is an eleemosynary institution, incorporated for the purpose of 
perpetuating the application of the bounty of the donors, to the specified objects of that 
bounty; that its trustees . . . were originally named by the founder . . . ; that they are not 
public officers, nor is it a civil institution, participating in the administration of 
government; but a charity-school . . . .35 
Hence, the College’s charter was a contract fully entitled to protection under the 
 
32  Id. at 629–30.  
33  See Henry J. Friendly, The Dartmouth College Case and the Public-Private 
Penumbra 10 (1969).  After all, as Judge Friendly demonstrated, current “state action” doctrine has 
“increasingly blurred” the distinction between government and private actors.  Id. at 11.  It seems 
to this author, nonetheless, that one might accept the blurry proposition that many purportedly 
private entities may be state actors for purposes of applying constitutional constraints to their 
actions, see, e.g., Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001) 
(holding that state interscholastic athletic association was a state actor subject to the First 
Amendment even though the NCAA at the college level was not), without necessarily undermining 
Marshall’s distinction in Dartmouth College.  For example, federal courts law recognizes a number 
of different “state-ness” tests for different purposes and in different contexts.  See, e.g., Hess v. 
Port Auth.  Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30 (1994) (applying a multifactor test to determine what 
actors count as an “arm of the state” enjoying state sovereign test); Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of 
Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913) (holding that a state officer may be a state actor for Fourteenth 
Amendment purposes even if acting in violation of state law); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) 
(holding that suit to enjoin a state officer for acting outside his lawful authority under federal law 
is not against the “state” for state sovereign immunity purposes).  Surely one may read Chief 
Justice Marshall as fashioning his particular public/private distinction test simply for the purpose 
of determining which state-granted charters trigger the protections of the Contracts Clause.  On 
the other hand, many of the concerns that Judge Friendly had about an overly expansive state 
action doctrine impinging on the autonomy of private institutions have come to pass, as I discuss 
in the concluding section. 
34  See Stith-Cabranes, supra note 9, at 14 (concluding that “the actual birth of the Dartmouth 
College was the joint product of private and public assets, of private and public efforts”). 
35  Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 640–41. 
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Contract Clause.36 
The Court had even less trouble determining that the act of the New Hampshire 
legislature had impaired this contract.  Chief Justice Marshall observed that “[t]he 
whole power of governing the college is transferred from trustees, appointed 
according to the will of the founder, expressed in the charter, to the executive of 
New Hampshire. . . . This is not an immaterial change.”37  Importantly, the Court did 
not care whether the changes introduced to the College by public governance would 
make good policy sense.  Those changes, the Court said, “may be for the advantage 
of this college in particular, and may be for the advantage of literature in general; 
but it is not according to the will of the donors, and is subversive of that contract, 
on the faith of which their property was given.”38  As primary protection for property 
rights shifted from contract to due process over the next century, however, the 
reasonableness of state interference with contractual rights would become the 
central question even when the Contracts Clause itself was invoked.39 
The outcome in Dartmouth College was hardly inevitable.  In particular, it was 
not obvious that the Court would extend the Contract Clause’s protection to 
corporate charters.  As Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged, “[i]t is more than 
possible, that the preservation of rights of this description was not particularly in 
the view of the framers of the constitution, when the clause under consideration 
was introduced into that instrument.”40  Rather, he suggested, “interferences of 
more frequent occurrence, to which the temptation was stronger, and of which the 
mischief was more extensive, constituted the great motive for imposing this 
restriction on the state legislatures.”41  Marshall no doubt had in mind the debtor 
relief legislation adopted by several state legislatures during the Confederation 
period.42  By restricting debtor relief legislation, the Contract Clause protected 
 
36  See id. at 650. 
37  Id. at 652. 
38  Id. at 653. 
39  See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 505–06 (1987); Energy 
Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412–13 (1983); see also Ely, supra note 12, 
at 245–47. 
40  Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 644; see also White, supra note 5, at 176 (“[I]t was by no 
means clear that a royal charter, imposing no limitations on its recipient, was a contract within 
the meaning of the Constitution.”). 
41  Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 644. 
42  See Ely, supra note 12, at 8–9; see also Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American 
Republic, 1776-1787, at 403–09 (1969) (identifying state debtor relief legislation as one of the key 
abuses of legislative power that concerned the Constitution’s framers). 
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contracts among private individuals and entities.  The Clause prevents the 
government from helping out one set of private parties (debtors) at the expense of 
another set of private parties (creditors) by restricting the debtor’s obligation to pay 
or the creditor’s remedies to enforce the deal. 
Dartmouth College applied the Contract Clause to a different scenario entirely, 
however.  Like its predecessor case Fletcher v. Peck,43 Dartmouth College dealt with the 
State’s own contracts, not contracts among private actors.44  But the State’s contract 
in Fletcher was a simple deal to sell land (if you can call a fraudulent deal to sell most 
of the later states of Alabama and Mississippi “simple”).45  The contract in Dartmouth 
College was the College charter itself—that is, it was an agreement that not only 
formalized a transaction, but created an institution.  The Supreme Court’s holding 
that the State of New Hampshire could not retroactively alter the terms of the 
charter established Dear Old Dartmouth’s autonomy from government control.  As 
Justice Bushrod Washington’s concurrence put it, “private and particular 
corporations for charity, founded and endowed by private persons, are subject to 
the private government of those who erect them.”46 
Some scholars have insisted that the historical evidence supports application of 
the clause only to contracts among private parties, although recent scholarship 
disputes this view.47  Evidence suggests, for instance, that the Framers may have 
intended to respond to controversies over legislative revocation of the charter of the 
Bank of North America.48   In any event, my point is simply that even though 
Marshall’s opinion focused on whether Dartmouth’s charter was the sort of charter 
protected by the Contract Clause—that is, whether the institution it created was 
“public” or “private” in character—the decision is also significant for its affirmation 
that charters could be covered at all.  That affirmation had significant institutional 
consequences for American civil society.  
 
43  Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 
44  Although the Court focused on whether the charter had created a “public” or “private” 
institution, the charter itself was plainly a “public” contract in the sense that the State was a party 
to it. 
45  See generally White, supra note 5, at 602–03; Currie, supra note 20, at 128–29. 
46  Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 660 (Washington, J., concurring). 
47  Compare Benjamin Fletcher Wright, Jr., The Contract Clause of the Constitution 
(1938) (arguing that the clause protected only contracts among private parties), with Ely, supra 
note 12, at 269–70 (rejecting this claim). 
48  See Ely, supra note 12, at 9–10. 
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I I .  T HE  S T R UC T UR A L  DI ME NS I ON OF  R I GHT S  C L A I MS  
One can’t be much of a vox clamantis in deserto49 if the Government is telling one 
what to cry out about.  American law has long respected the importance of 
institutional autonomy for colleges and universities, although nowadays we 
typically look to the First Amendment as the primary ground for that autonomy.50  
But the early Republic lacked modern conceptions of academic freedom, and the 
First Amendment did not yet bind the State of New Hampshire in 1819.51  Historian 
Jurgen Herbst thus describes the Court’s Contract Clause holding in Dartmouth 
College as “the magna carta of the American system of higher education in which 
private and public institutions develop side by side, and the private colleges are 
protected against state violation of their charter without their consent.”52  
The Court’s decision ensured the College’s ability to choose its own path 
without state interference on any number of issues of the day: how to respond to 
the evangelical tide of the Second Great Awakening; whether to remain an island of 
Federalist politics amidst a rising tide of Jeffersonian Republicanism; whether to 
focus on a classical education heavy with dead language or to teach more practical 
subjects like agricultural science.53  Today, the College is free to be a critical voice in 
New Hampshire and national politics, an autonomous forum for debate during 
presidential campaigns,54 and an independent pioneer in the College’s many fields 
of teaching and research.  This independence is not solely attributable to Dartmouth 
College v. Woodward, of course. But certainly the Marshall Court’s decision is an 
 
49  The College’s motto, which translates to “a voice crying out in the wilderness.”  See Dartmouth 
at a Glance, https://home.dartmouth.edu/dartmouth-glance Home.Dartmouth.edu [https://
perma.cc/N6PX-XWLF] (last visited Aug. 29, 2019). 
50  See cases cited in note 11, supra; see also Frederick Schauer, Is There a Right to Academic Freedom?, 
77 U. Colo. L. Rev. 907, 925–26 (2006) (offering “an institutional account of the First Amendment” 
that “recognize[s] a special place for the country’s colleges and universities, whose historical and 
current mission is to play a central role in challenging conventional wisdom”); Joseph Blocher, 
Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 Duke L. J. 821, 821–22 (2008). 
51  See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833) (recognizing that the original Bill of 
Rights did not constrain state governments). 
52  Jurgen Herbst, How to Think about the Dartmouth College Case, 26 Hist. of Educ. Quart. 342, 
346–47 (1986). 
53  See Stith-Cabranes, supra note 9, at 11–13; Johnson, supra note 23, at 50–52. 
54  See, e.g., Dudley Clendinen, 8 Democrats are Enticed into a No-Rules Debate, N.Y. Times (Jan. 12, 
1984) [https://perma.cc/UFN8-JXHH] (discussing the first televised “talk show” presidential 
primary debate at Dartmouth College, conducted in a format outside the control of the 
campaigns).  
D A R T M O U T H  C O L L E G E  V .  W O O D W A R D  A N D  T H E  S T R U C T U R E  O F  C I V I L  S O C I E T Y  
51 
important part of the story.55 
My central point is that the autonomy that the Dartmouth College case conferred 
on the College is more than just the sum total of the individual liberties enjoyed by 
its students and faculty.  By safeguarding the autonomy of private institutions of 
higher learning, the Contract Clause plays a structural role.  Professor Akhil Amar 
has surveyed the many ways in which constitutional provisions that we generally 
think of as individual rights provisions also play vital structural roles in American 
constitutionalism.56  The Sixth and Seventh Amendments safeguard not only the 
individual right of the accused to be judged by a jury of his peers but also the 
institutional role of the jury as a democratic check on judges and prosecutors.57  The 
Second Amendment protects not only, or even primarily, an individual right to bear 
arms but also the institution of the militia as a military check on centralized 
tyranny.  The original understanding of the Establishment Clause protected state 
establishments of religion against federal interference or a federal effort to 
establish a national church. 
So far, all the examples I’ve given are public institutions—the jury, the militia, 
an established state church.  These institutions are not that different from more 
familiar structural features of the Constitution’s separation of powers.  But as 
Professor Amar also noted, the Bill of Rights protects the autonomy of a number of 
private institutions that also play structural roles.  The Press Clause of the First 
Amendment, for example, protects the autonomy of the media as a vital check on 
both public and private power.58  The Speech Clause likewise protects the rights not 
only of individuals but also of the institutions they form in order to exercise a more 
effective voice in public affairs, whether those be public interest organizations like 
the NAACP or the Sierra Club or quasi-public but extra-constitutional entities like 
 
55  See, e.g., Whitehead, How to Think about Dartmouth College, supra note 7, at 338 (conceding the 
importance of the case in this regard despite prior skepticism). 
56  See Amar, supra note 13, at 1131–32. 
57  See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305–06 (2004) (“That right [to a jury trial] is no 
mere procedural formality, but a fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional 
structure.  Just as suffrage ensures the people's ultimate control in the legislative and executive 
branches, jury trial is meant to ensure their control in the judiciary.”). 
58  See, e.g., Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 260 (1974) (White, J., concurring) 
(“The Constitution specifically selected the press . . . to play an important role in the discussion of 
public affairs.  Thus the press serves and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any 
abuses of power by governmental officials and as a constitutionally chosen means for keeping 
officials elected by the people responsible to all the people whom they were selected to serve.”). 
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political parties.59  The Religion Clauses, in conjunction, protect the autonomy of 
religious institutions that play pivotal roles in American public life, whether by 
political activity, good works, or simply offering the example of an alternative way 
of life.60  All these institutions fall outside the governmental separation of powers, but 
they contribute to the broader separation of powers within American civil society.  
The structural role that rights-bearing institutions play is distinct from the 
important role that institutions play in assisting individuals who wish to exercise 
their constitutional rights.  The latter role is more familiar in American law, if not 
uncontroversial.  In NAACP v. Alabama,61 for instance, the Court recognized that 
allowing a corporation to assert First Amendment rights on behalf of its members 
could render those members’ speech rights more effective.  Similarly—but more 
controversially—the Court has allowed corporations to assert free speech and free 
exercise claims to challenge federal statutes regulating campaign expenditures and 
contraceptive insurance, respectively.62  In this essay, however, I want to focus on 
the more structural role of rights that simply ensure the autonomy of private 
institutions whose activities contribute to the maintenance of a robust civil society, 
whether or not those activities themselves involve the exercise of constitutional 
rights.  
The Contract Clause, as interpreted in Dartmouth College, falls squarely into this 
category of rights provisions with structural implications.  This structural aspect of 
the case is part of what may be lost in the movement from contract to due process 
in contemporary Contract Clause doctrine.  Once the Court found that the College 
Charter was a protected contract, it asked only whether the State of New 
Hampshire’s law purporting to modify that contract had modified the charter’s 
 
59  See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (recognizing right of NAACP to challenge state 
restrictions on its activities under the First Amendment); see also California Democratic Party v. 
Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000) (striking down California’s blanket primary on the ground that it 
violated a political party’s First Amendment right of association).  
60  See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 183–84 
(2012) (recognizing that the Establishment and Free Exercise Clause, in tandem, shield religious 
organizations from certain forms of government interference with their autonomy); Kedroff v. 
Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952) (recognizing churches’ “power to decide for 
themselves, free from state interference, matters of church governance as well as those of faith 
and doctrine”); see generally Richard W. Garnett, The Freedom of the Church: (Towards) an Exposition, 
Translation, and Defense, in The Rise of Corporate Religious Liberty 39 (Micah Schwartzman, 
Chad Flanders, & Zoë Robinson, eds. 2015). 
61  357 U.S. 449, 458–459 (1958). 
62  See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 
U.S. 682 (2014).  
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terms and transferred power to govern the institution from the Trustees to the 
State.63  It didn’t ask whether the educational reforms that the State had arguably 
taken control of the College to effect were reasonable or beneficial.  As Professor 
Stith-Cabranes has demonstrated, they quite plausibly were reasonable and 
beneficial.64  Contemporary Contract Clause doctrine, which is modeled on the Due 
Process Clause’s deferential reasonableness test,65 would have asked precisely that 
question.  
One hopes that if the contemporary Court confronted a Contract Clause case 
like Dartmouth College, where the question is the State’s power to alter an agreement 
providing for an institution’s basic autonomy, the only issue would be whether the 
challenged law meaningfully impaired that autonomy.  That is what the Court has 
done in analogous cases under the Religion Clauses.  In the Hosanna-Tabor case,66 
for instance, the Court unanimously confirmed the “ministerial exception,” which 
guarantees religious institutions’ autonomy to choose whom they like to perform 
ministerial functions without regard to the reasonableness of the constraints that 
the State might like to impose.  The crucial point is that the movement from contract 
to due process in protecting contractual rights should not be allowed to obscure the 
Contract Clause’s important structural role in protecting the autonomy of 
contractual institutions. 
I I I .  P R I VAT E  C OL L E GE S ,  I NT E R ME DI AR Y I N S T I T UT I ON S ,  AN D T HE  
C ONS T I T UT I ONAL  S AF E GUAR DS  OF  C I VI L  S OC I E T Y 
The remainder of this essay considers the importance of this sort of 
institutional autonomy for American politics and society.  To do that, I turn to Alexis 
de Tocqueville’s analysis of American society, which he published in 1835 and 1840 
at the close of the Marshall Court.67  Tocqueville thought that the dominant 
characteristic of American democracy was the widespread condition of equality 
among Americans; equality was, for him, “the generative fact from which each 
 
63  See Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 652–53 (1819).  
64  Stith-Cabranes, supra note 9, at 13. 
65  See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 505–06 (1987); Energy 
Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412–13 (1983); see also Ely, supra 
note 12, at 245–47. 
66  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188–89 (2012) 
67  As Professor White notes, Tocqueville’s famous observations about the role of law and 
lawyers in American society pertained to the Marshall Court era and were influenced significantly 
by Justice Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution.  See White, supra note 5, at 111. 
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particular fact seemed to issue.”68  Although he did not overlook the glaring 
inequalities of slavery,69 he focused on the absence in white American society of the 
fixed social hierarchies associated with European monarchy and aristocracy.70  
Tocqueville thought American equality left our society open to a particular 
danger, however, which he variously called “individualism” or “democratic 
despotism.”71  He worried that “when citizens are all nearly equal, it becomes 
difficult for them to defend their independence against the aggressions of power.”72  
This is in part because equality tends to induce each citizen “to isolate himself from 
the mass of those like him and to withdraw to one side with his family and his 
friends, so that after having thus created a little society for his own use, he willingly 
abandons society at large to itself.”73  Moreover, the tide of democratic equality 
tends to wash away all the traditional intermediary institutions that used to stand 
between the individual and the state: the aristocracy, the established Church, the 
merchant and craft guilds, and the like.74  Once this occurred, Tocqueville worried, 
the individual would find herself isolated from her fellows and unable to prevent the 
inexorable expansion of the State.75  This would end, Tocqueville believed, not in the 
 
68  See Tocqueville, supra note 14, Introduction, at 3. 
69  See id., Vol. I, Part Two, ch. 10, at 326 (identifying the problem of slavery as “[t]he most 
dreadful of all the evils that threaten the future of the United States”).  
70  See id., Vol. 1, Part 1, ch. 3, at 45–53. 
71  Id., Vol. 1, Part 1, ch. 3, at lii, lxiii. 
72  See id., Vol. 1, Part 1, ch. 3, at 52. 
73  See id., Vol. 2, Part 2, ch. 2, at 482. 
74  See id., Vol. 2, Part 4, ch. 2, at 640 (observing that “[t]he idea of secondary powers, placed 
between sovereign and subjects, naturally presented itself to the imagination of aristocratic 
peoples” but “is naturally absent from the minds of men in centuries of equality”); Harvey C. 
Mansfield & Delba Winthrop, Editors’ Introduction, to Tocqueville, supra note 14, at lxxi 
(describing the checking roles of “secondary powers” of aristocracy, clergy, and local 
administration); see also John O. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville’s America: The Rehnquist Court’s 
Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 485, 501 (2002) (criticizing the Warren Court, which 
“both expanded the power of the centralized state and carved out a sphere of personal expression 
and sexual autonomy,” for failing to “concentrate on protecting institutions that mediate between 
the centralized state and the individual”).  
75  See Tocqueville, supra note 14, Vol. 2, Part 4, ch. 3, at 643–45; see also Yuval Levin, The 
Fractured Republic: Renewing America’s Social Contract in the Age of Individualism 
186 (2016) (“[A]s our own experience has demonstrated, hyper-individualism and excessive 
centralization are not opposite inclinations but complementary impulses.  As a centralizing 
government draws power out of the mediating institutions of society, it leaves individuals more 
isolated; and as individualism further erodes the bonds that hold civil society together, people 
conclude that only a central authority can pick up the slack.”). 
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violent tyranny of past ages but in a despotism that “would be more extensive and 
milder, and [that] would degrade men without tormenting them.”76  These concerns 
about the erosion of the American social fabric still echo in the work of 
contemporary social scientists like Robert Bellah77 and Robert Putnam.78 
Tocqueville thought the way out of this dilemma for egalitarian democracies lay 
in Americans’ propensity to replace the old intermediary institutions with a wide 
array of decentralized political institutions and private associations.79  These 
institutions and associations tended to pull individuals out of themselves and 
encourage them to combine and cooperate with their fellow citizens.80  As John 
McGinnis explains, “[c]ivil associations promote reciprocity among their members 
and create social norms from which other individuals can voluntarily choose.  In 
this way they generate what modern sociologists would call social capital: the glue 
that binds society together through a group of interlocking networks.”81  Edmund 
Burke expressed a similar idea when he said that “[t]o be attached to the subdivision, 
to love the little platoon we belong to in society, is the first principle (the germ as it 
were) of public affections. It is the first link in the series by which we proceed toward 
a love to our country, and to mankind.”82 
One might think of these civic institutions in terms of James Madison’s 
“extended sphere” of the American Republic, in which a “greater variety of parties 
and interests” competes, cooperates, and negotiates.83  Madison’s extended sphere 
is inhabited not by individuals, but by groups and institutions.  This grand mosh pit 
of clashing interests and institutions provides a filter and a check upon the selfish 
interests of particular factions, but it depends on the existence of a vibrant civil 
society full of varied intermediary institutions.  As Tocqueville put it, “[a] political, 
 
76  Tocqueville, supra note 14, Vol. 2, Part 4, ch. 6, at 662. 
77  See Robert N. Bellah, Richard Madsen, William N. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, & Steven 
M. Tipton, Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life (1985). 
78  See Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American 
Community (2000).  See also Myron Magnet, The End of Democracy in America, City J., Spring 2016, 
at https://www.city-journal.org/html/end-democracy-america-14332.html [https://perma.cc/
MCM6-A4FX] (arguing that Tocqueville accurately—and ominously—predicted the growth of the 
centralized American administrative state). 
79  See Tocqueville, supra note 14, Vol. II, Part Two, ch. 5, at 489–92; Part Four, ch. 7, at 666–73. 
80  See id., Vol. II, Part Two, ch. 5, at 492. 
81  McGinnis, supra note 74, at 491. 
82  Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, 41 (J. G. A. Pocock ed., 
Hackett Pub. Co. 1987) (1790). 
83  See The Federalist No. 10, at 64 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed., 1961) (1787). 
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industrial, commercial, or even scientific and literary association is an enlightened 
and powerful citizen whom one can neither bend at will nor oppress in the dark and 
who, in defending its particular rights against the exigencies of power, saves 
common freedoms.”84 
Tocqueville gives us a lens to understand not only Federalist 10 but also 
Federalist 51, in which Madison talks about institutional checks and balances in the 
separation of powers.85  Federalist 51 focuses on public institutions: the mutually 
checking prerogatives of Congress, the President, the Judiciary, and (at the end) the 
States.86  But Tocqueville emphasizes what Madison also recognized in Federalist 
10, which is that the structure of civil society itself is crucial in maintaining 
constitutional government.87  A civil society full of robust intermediary institutions 
both helps prevent concentrations of power within the Government and also keeps 
the Government from dominating the private sector.88  With apologies to my friend 
Heather Gerken, who wrote an article entitled “Federalism All the Way Down,”89 we 
might call this “Separation of Powers All the Way Out.”  But whatever we call it, the 
key point is that “constitutionalism relies not only on the separation and limitation 
of the powers of the political authority, but also on the existence and health of 
authorities and associations outside, and meaningfully independent of, that 
political authority.”90 
What does all this have to do with the Dartmouth College case?  I want to make 
both a general and a more specific point.  The broad point is that the constitutional 
order does not simply piggyback upon a pre-existing civil society; it helps to create 
and perpetuate that society by protecting the autonomy of private intermediary 
institutions.  As I’ve already noted, the Press Clause helps generate and preserve an 
independent Fourth Estate, while the Religion Clauses help encourage and protect 
robust religious institutions and associations that are independent of state control.  
Likewise, Dartmouth College’s construction of the Contract Clause protected these 
intermediary institutions’ integrity and right to self-government.  As Judge Henry 
Friendly put it, “one of the great contributions of the Dartmouth College decision was 
 
84  Tocqueville, supra note 14, Vol. II, Part Four, ch. 7, at 668. 
85  The Federalist No. 51, at 347–53 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed., 1961) (1788).  
86  See id. at 347–49. 
87  See Mansfield & Winthrop, supra note 74, at xliii (discussing Tocqueville’s emphasis on 
sociology and psychology over formal political structures). 
88  See Tocqueville, supra note 14, Vol. II, Part Four, ch. 7, at 667–69. 
89  Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism All the Way 
Down, 134 Harv. L. Rev. 5 (2010). 
90  Garnett, supra note 60, at 46. 
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the impetus it gave to voluntary associations as a factor in American life.”91  
The narrow point has to do with private colleges and universities in particular.  
The last time that the College called people together to celebrate Daniel Webster’s 
glorious victory—on its 175th anniversary in 1994—Justice Harry Blackmun affirmed 
that “the decision provided a safeguard for the development of private education in 
this country.”92  Many factors, of course, contributed to the development of private 
higher education, and the modern divergence of public and private models didn’t 
really crystallize until the 1870s.93  But Justice Blackmun was not wrong to suggest 
that Dartmouth College played an important role.  For one thing, as Professor Eldon 
Johnson observed, it produced “a chilling effect on state intrusion into higher 
education governance anywhere anytime.”94  
As I’ve already discussed, a variety of constitutional features—including not 
only the Contract Clause but also the Free Speech Clause (protecting academic 
freedom), the Religion Clauses (protecting the autonomy of sectarian religious 
colleges and universities, which for the first century or so was nearly all of them), 
and the structure of American federalism—have helped bring about precisely the 
sort of robust and diverse civil society in the educational sphere that Tocqueville 
would have praised.  We have outstanding research institutions like M.I.T. and 
Harvard, vibrant sectarian institutions like Notre Dame and Brigham Young, 
iconoclastic dissenting enclaves like Oberlin and Hillsdale, and even a few 
professional sports franchises like Oklahoma and Ohio State.  These varied 
institutional models are bound to produce a variety of perspectives and outputs.  It 
would be a mistake to leave out the state schools.  One irony of Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward was that the menacing governmental entity was the State of New 
Hampshire—not exactly an imposing government by today’s standards.95  By 
deciding not to create a great centralized national university, and by facilitating the 
development of state land grant colleges through the Morrill Acts,96 Congress 
ensured a decentralized future for American higher education even within the 
public realm.  American higher education is a Madisonian extended sphere. 
 
91  Friendly, supra note 33, at 12. 
92  Blackmun, supra note 8, at 6. 
93  See generally Johnson, supra note 23, at 63–67. 
94  Id. at 67. 
95  But see Sweezy, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).  In Sweezy, the Granite State revived its academic reign of 
terror, over a century after Dartmouth College, by jailing a Marxist academic over a lecture he 
delivered at the University of New Hampshire.  The Supreme Court was not amused, reversing 
Sweezy’s conviction as a violation of due process.  See id. at 254–55 (plurality opinion). 
96  7 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1862, 1890). 
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And this robust educational constellation does, in fact, perform many of the 
functions Tocqueville praised in American private associations.  College and alumni 
communities do draw individuals out of their private lives and into community with 
their fellow members, often for decades after graduation.  Colleges habituate 
individuals to serve others, and they train them to do that service effectively.  They 
may be important participants in national political debates, such as affirmative 
action,97 and their internal controversies train individuals to be effective 
participants in broader debates later on.  All this is possible, in part, because the 
Constitution’s rights provisions do not simply empower individuals, but give rise to 
institutions playing structural roles. 
Characteristically, I am going to end with a worry.  Just as private institutions 
may play an important role in the separation of powers, broadly construed, so too 
that role can be undermined by the same sorts of forces that have undermined 
separation of powers in the public sphere.  One thing plaguing contemporary 
constitutional theory—and making it a lot more interesting—is the need to revise 
our assumptions about how institutional checks and balances function in light of 
changes in the nature of American political life.98  One such change is a general 
decline in social capital; as Robert Putnam has observed, “we have been pulled apart 
from one another and from our communities over the last third of the century.”99  
The other change, of course, is increasingly high degrees of partisanship and 
ideological polarization.100  
One can readily see how polarization undermines the effectiveness of other civil 
society institutions.  Polarization has fragmented the media, for example, so that 
Americans of different ideological persuasions can pretty much choose their media 
outlets so that they only hear what they want to hear.101  Churches and other 
religious institutions have to some extent followed a similar path, and the 
 
97  See, e.g., Brief of Harvard University, Brown University, the University of Chicago, 
Dartmouth College, Duke University, the University of Pennsylvania, Princeton University, and 
Yale University, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241 & 02-516). 
98  See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos & Ernest A. Young, State Public-Law Litigation in an Age of 
Polarization, 97 Tex. L. Rev. 43, 50–65 (2018). 
99  Putnam, supra note 78, at 27. 
100  See, e.g., Marc J. Hetherington & Thomas J. Rudolph, Why Washington Won’t Work 
(2015); Christopher Hare & Keith T. Poole, The Polarization of Contemporary American Politics, 46 
Polity 411 (2014); Ronald Brownstein, The Second Civil War: How Extreme Partisanship 
has Paralyzed Washington and Polarized America (2007). 
101  See, e.g., Brett Edkins, Report: US Media Among Most Polarized in the World, Forbes (June 27, 
2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brettedkins/2017/06/27/u-s-media-among-most-polarized-
in-the-world-study-finds/#6e0702222546 [https://perma.cc/KPV7-KK34]. 
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increasing secularism of one party and defensiveness of the other threatens the 
ability of religious institutions to straddle and meliorate ideological and political 
divides.102 
Similar things are happening to institutions of higher education.  On the public 
side, the impression that public universities are out of step with the viewpoints and 
needs of the run of American society has led to incursions on the independence of 
those universities.  This has happened, for instance, both in my native state of Texas 
and my current home of North Carolina.103  But the problem is not confined to 
public institutions.  The perception (and often the reality) that colleges and 
universities of all stripes have largely taken sides in the partisan and ideological 
wars104 has hurt the credibility of academic voices in political and policy debates and 
may, in the long term, prompt those who feel excluded by all this side-taking to seek 
other educational models altogether.105  
 
102  See generally Robert D. Putnam & David E. Campbell, American Grace: How Religion 
Divides and Unites Us 3–4 (2010); Lyman Stone, “Mainline” churches are emptying.  The political 
effects could be huge, Vox (July 14, 2017), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/7/14/
15959682/evangelical-mainline-voting-patterns-trump [https://perma.cc/ES25-XAMD]. 
103  See, e.g., UT-Austin at center of fight over the purpose of college, USA Today (Feb. 2, 2013) 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/02/02/texas-higher-ed-clash/1885923/ 
[https://perma.cc/SGX6-3D6T]; Jane Stancill, There’s a reason UNC’s board seems like an arm of the 
legislature, Raleigh News & Observer (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.newsobserver.com/news/
local/education/article181345551.html. 
104  See, e.g., John LaLoggia, Republicans have doubts that colleges, K-12 schools are open to range of 
viewpoints, Pew Research Center (July 19, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/
07/19/republicans-have-doubts-that-colleges-k-12-schools-are-open-to-range-of-viewpoints/ 
[https://perma.cc/5XTM-EYRJ]; Sam Abrams, Professors moved left since 1990s, rest of country did not, 
Research Summary, Heterodox Academy (Jan. 9, 2015), https://heterodoxacademy.org/
professors-moved-left-but-country-did-not/ [https://perma.cc/7XL8-C3SQ]; Mitchell Langbert, 
Anthony J. Quain, & Daniel B. Klein, Faculty Voter Registration in Economics, History, Journalism, Law, 
and Psychology, 13 Econ. J. Watch 422 (2016); see also Adam S. Chilton & Eric A. Posner, An Empirical 
Study of Political Bias in Legal Scholarship, 44 J. Legal Stud. 277 (2015); John L. McGinnis, Matthew 
Schwartz & Benjamin Tisdell, The Patterns and Implications of Political Contributions by Elite Law 
School Faculty, 93 Geo. L.J. 1167, 1169 (2005). 
105  See, e.g., Anna Brown, Most Americans say higher ed is heading in wrong direction, but partisans 
disagree on why, Pew Research Center (July 26, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2018/07/26/most-americans-say-higher-ed-is-heading-in-wrong-direction-but-partisans-
disagree-on-why/ [https://perma.cc/3HEH-8HYL]; Morgan Marietta, Against the Professors: 
Perceptions of Ideological Bias and Dueling Facts, Psychology Today (May 16, 2019), 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/gb/blog/inconvenient-facts/201905/against-the-professors 
[https://perma.cc/2P9V-8NZ2]; Glenn Reynolds, Higher ed’s prejudice problem, USA Today (Feb. 27, 
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A related concern was voiced by our own Kate Stith-Cabranes at the 175th 
anniversary gathering.  She pointed out that: 
[T]oday the government’s ability to circumscribe the autonomy of colleges and 
universities—and, of course, note it is the federal government more than the states 
which threatens to do so—is less likely to take the form of direct legislative fiat and more 
likely to take the form of conditions attached to the receipt of government aid.106   
These sorts of conditions have enabled national executive agencies under both the 
Obama and Trump administrations to induce important changes to university 
governance through “dear colleague” letters.107  
I would submit that the tendency of educational institutions to take sides in the 
ideology wars has undermined their autonomy in these settings.  It is a 
commonplace of separation of powers scholarship that partisan allegiances cause 
different institutions of government to be less interested in checking 
encroachments by the other branches when the same political party controls both 
branches.108  Partisan agreement may have a similar effect of causing universities 
to give up too much autonomy when intrusive government measures dovetail with 
their own ideological convictions.  On the other hand, forces seeking to intrude on 
university policy in less congenial ways may take arguments for institutional 
autonomy less seriously when those arguments are not consistently advanced. At 
Duke, where I teach, some of those chickens may be coming home to roost as the 
Department of Education has threatened to pull federal grants from a Middle East 
studies program that the Department views as biased.109 




106  Stith-Cabranes, supra note 9, at 16. 
107  See, e.g., KC Johnson & Stuart Taylor, The path to Obama’s ‘Dear Colleague’ letter, The Volokh 
Conspiracy (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/
2017/01/31/the-path-to-obamas-dear-colleague-letter/ [https://perma.cc/NNU9-DUKK] 
(discussing Obama administration guidance on campus sexual assault); Claire Hansen, New Title 
IX Guidance Gives Schools Choice in Sexual Misconduct Cases, U.S. News & World Report (Sept. 26, 
2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/education-news/articles/2017-09-26/new-title-ix-
guidance-gives-schools-choice-in-sexual-misconduct-cases [https://perma.cc/TT6Y-HJ8H] 
(discussing Trump administration action rescinding that guidance).  
108  See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 Harv. L. 
Rev. 2311 (2006). 
109  Collin Binkley, Feds Cite Islam Focus in Review of Duke-UNC Language Grant, Associated Press 
(Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/430e62044dba43daa3f2332792cd97b2 [https://perma.cc
/3YJH-2CNY]. 
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oppose intrusions on institutional autonomy when the measures in questions seem 
profoundly just and correct as a matter of substance.110  But structural values will 
not endure if we only defend them when they suit our substantive preferences.  
More fundamentally, it is important to recognize that much of the value of private 
intermediary institutions in civil society may stem from their ability, at least in 
theory, to straddle and meliorate the divides that convulse the governmental sphere.  
Colleges and universities should be a place where people of varying views come 
together, and the formidable bonds of loyalty that places like Dear Old Dartmouth 
engender ought to be a source of common ground.  That will help us remember 
more generally that Americans who passionately disagree about this or that burning 
issue of the day nonetheless share important things in common.   
 
110  See Stith-Cabranes, supra note 9, at 16. 
